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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has appellate jurisdiction over 
the appeal of this case by virtue of the following statutes and 
rules: Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(i) (1990); Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-46b-14,-16,-17 (1990), Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15, and Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did Mountain Fuel fail to marshal the evidence before 
the Commission on the proper rate base and the adjustment to the 
rate of return? 
2. Does Mountain Fuel's failure to proffer evidence on a 
future test year preclude the Company from arguing that the 
Commission's exclusion of that evidence was error? 
3. Does Mountain Fuel's failure to request any relief on 
the test year issue render that issue moot? 
4. Was there substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's findings on average rate base and the rate of return 
adjustment? 
5. Does the Commission have discretion to order an historic 
or future test year? 
6. Has Mountain Fuel been prejudiced by the Commission's 
choice of an average rate base? 
7. Does the Commission have the authority, within a range 
of reasonableness, to adjust a utility's return for efficiency or 
mi smanagement ? 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes, which are reproduced in full in 
Appendix I, are determinative of the issues presented in this 
review: Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-1, 54-4-4, 54-4-21 and 54-7-19. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case (PSC Docket No. 89-057-15) was initiated by the 
Public Service Commission in 1989 on its own motion to determine 
whether or not the rates Mountain Fuel was charging were just and 
reasonable. There had been no rate hearing for Mountain Fuel 
since 1985. On November 21, 1989, after hearing arguments from 
the parties and taking administrative notice of the current 
economic conditions, the Commission bench-ordered a 1989 
historical test year. On January 22, 1990, the Division filed a 
motion to consolidate the rate hearing with Docket 90-057-02 
(Mountain Fuel's gas cost pass-through proceeding). The 
Commission granted that motion. Hearings began on September 5, 
1990 and continued through oral arguments on September 28, 1990. 
On November 21, 1990, the Commission issued its Report and 
Order increasing Mountain Fuel's rates by approximately $76,000. 
On December 21, 1990, Mountain Fuel filed an Application for 
Rehearing. On January 10, 1991, the Commission issued its Order 
denying Mountain Fuel's Application for Rehearing, except for one 
minor issue on which the Commission suggested a possible 
stipulation. R. at 2164. The parties were unable to reach a 
stipulation. On February 8, 1991, Mountain Fuel filed a Petition 
for Review and on March 1, 1991 filed its Docketing Statement 
2 
with the Court. On February 14, 1991 the Committee of Consumer 
Services filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and on February 
22, 1991, the Division of Public Utilities filed a similar 
Motion. These motions were subsequently granted by the Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent and Intervenors agree with Mountain Fuel's 
Statement of Facts with the following exceptions: 
1. In the November 21, 1989 arguments on the proper test 
year, Mountain Fuel states that the PSC took no evidence.1 The 
Commission did take administrative notice of the rate of 
inflation during the period since the Company's last rate case. 
R. at 39-40. 
2. Although the Commission did not articulate in detail its 
reasons for ordering an historical test year on November 21, 
1989, those reasons were articulated in its Report and Order 
issued on November 21, 1990. Mountain Fuel never requested that 
the Commission articulate its reasons prior to issuance of its 
November 21, 1990 Report and Order. 
3. On August 27, 1990, a week before the hearings 
commenced, the Commission sent the parties of record a Memorandum 
which stated: 
In this docket, parties differ on whether year-end 
or average rate base is appropriate for test period 
purposes. We intend to resolve the dispute early in 
the proceeding. 
As the first matter to be taken up when the 
hearing begins, each party will be expected to present, 
1
 Opening Brief of Mountain Fuel at 5. 
3 
through its attorney or a designated witness, a concise 
statement of the reasons for its choice. Among other 
things, each statement must address, first, our use in 
recent U S West and Utah Power & Light cases of average 
rate base in conjunction with historic test years, and 
second, the problem this choice creates for matching 
test year revenues, expenses, and rate base.2 
In response, on August 31, 1990, the Division filed the 
surrebuttal testimony of Carl L. Mower. The Committee responded 
on September 4, 1990 by filing a "Statement on Year-end versus 
Average Rate Base..." consisting of pp. 3-8 of the prefiled 
surrebuttal testimony of Michael Arndt. On September 5, 1990, at 
the beginning of the rate hearing, James Balthaser testified on 
the issue for Mountain Fuel and Carl L. Mower for the Division. 
Committee witness Arndt, who lives in Iowa, was not scheduled to 
testify until September 12, 1990. Although the Commission had 
indicated a desire to rule immediately on the year-end versus 
average rate base issue (R. at 15-6), Mountain Fuel's objection 
to the receipt of Mr. Arndt's pre-filed testimony prior to cross-
examination foreclosed the Commission from entering an early 
ruling on the issue. The Committee's statement on year end vs. 
average rate base (Arndt Surrebuttal, pp. 3-8) was admitted when 
Mr. Arndt appeared personally to testify on September 12, 1990.3 
Mountain Fuel's assertion that the Committee's position statement 
on this issue was never made a part of the record* is, 
therefore, mistaken. 
2
 R. at 1672. Appendix 2. 
3
 See R. at 651-2, 45-7, 62, 94-6, 101-02.. 
A
 Opening Brief of Mountain Fuel at 38. 
4 
4. Other misstatements of fact, and statements of fact not 
based upon the record before the Court on appeal, are noted in 
the text of the Brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Test Year* Mountain Fuel's arguments against the 
Commission's choice of a 1989 historic test year must fail 
because: 1. The Company never proffered the results of a future 
test year. 2. Since Company failed to request any relief on the 
test year issue, the appeal moot. 3. The Commission has 
discretion under Utah law to order an appropriate test year. 
Rate Base. Since Mountain Fuel failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the Commission's use of an average rate base, 
the Commission's findings are conclusive. In addition, the 
findings on average rate base were based on substantial evidence. 
Finally, even if the Commission did err on this issue, the error 
was harmless. 
Rate of Return. Since Mountain Fuel failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the Commission's adjustment to the Company's 
rate of return, those findings are conclusive; nevertheless, the 
rate of return adjustment was supported by substantial evidence. 
Within a range of reasonableness, the Commission has broad 
authority to set a utility's rate of return. 
PART I. TEST YEAR ISSUE 
Standard of Review on Test Year Issue. The test year issue 
5 
raised by Mountain Fuel in this appeal5 has to do with whether 
or not as a matter of law Mountain Fuel has the right to submit, 
and the Commission is required to consider, a future or 
forecasted test period in a rate proceeding. The plain language 
of Section 54-4-4(3) (1990) gives the Commission discretion to 
consider a future test period: 
The Commission, in its determination of just and 
reasonable rates, may consider recent changes in 
the utility's financial condition or changes 
reasonably expected, but not speculative, in the 
utility's revenues, expenses or investments and 
may adopt an appropriate future test period, not 
exceeding twelve months from the date of filing, 
including projections or projections together with 
a period of actual operations in determining the 
utility's test year for ratemaking purposes. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mountain Fuel argues that the term "may" really means 
"shall" and that the Commission is mandated to consider any 
forecasts of future economic circumstances Mountain Fuel wishes 
to put before it. The construction of terms in a statute would 
appear to be something for the Court to undertake as a purely 
legal function. However, the exclusion of a future test period in 
a given case is based upon practical considerations "subject to 
the Commission's expertise, gleaned from its accumulated 
practical, first-hand experience with the subject matter."6 But 
3
 Part I of the Brief of Respondent and Intervenors deals with 
Part I, Sections A-F of Mountain Fuel's Brief. Part I, Section G 
of that Brief, which deals with the proper rate base, is a separate 
issue from the proper test year and is addressed in Respondent's 
and Intervenors' Brief in Part II. 
6
 Morton Intern., Inc. v. Auditing Div. , 814 P.2d 581, 587 
(Utah 1991) . 
6 
whether or not a correction-of-error standard is applied to this 
issue or a deference standard is applied because of the 
Commission's experience, the result should be the same. 
ARGUMENT 
A. MOUNTAIN FUEL'S FAILURE TO MAKE A PROFFER OF 
FUTURE TEST YEAR EVIDENCE PRECLUDES IT FROM 
ASSERTING ON APPEAL THAT THE COMMISSION'S 
EXCLUSION OF THAT EVIDENCE WAS ERROR. 
Mountain Fuel has alleged that the Commission erred in 
ordering an historical test period based on actual hard data and 
in precluding the use of a. future test period. There were 
several practical, common-sense reasons why the Commission 
decided to use historical information and those will be discussed 
hereafter. But quite apart from those reasons, Mountain Fuel 
never made a proffer of the potential difference in rates the use 
of a future test period would make. In other words, while 
Mountain Fuel argued very strenuously that it be allowed to place 
its forecasted test period before the Commission,7 it never 
explained to the Commission how and in what degree the use of 
projected data as opposed to actual data would make a difference 
in the Company's revenue requirement or rates ultimately arrived 
at by the Commission. 
Rule 103(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that error 
may not be predicated upon a ruling which excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and an offer 
of proof is made. This Court has consistently held that a 
7
 R. at 3-17, 18-36. Arguments on the proper test year were 
heard by the Commission on November 21, 1989. 
7 
party's failure to make a proffer as to what the excluded 
evidence would show precludes that party from asserting on appeal 
that the exclusion of the evidence was error.8 Mountain Fuel 
should be precluded from alleging error on the Commission's part 
because it failed to show that the allegation made any 
difference. 
Mountain Fuel's failure to proffer is critical in 
considering the appeal it has filed. Its failure made it 
impossible for the Commission or this Court on review to conclude 
that the use of projected as opposed to actual historical data 
would make any difference. The consideration, therefore, of 
Mountain Fuel's argument at this point is moot, and the statutory 
interpretation which Mountain Fuel requests would amount to no 
more than an advisory opinion. 
B. SINCE MOUNTAIN FUEL FAILED TO REQUEST ANY RELIEF 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE TEST YEAR ISSUE, THE APPEAL 
ON THIS ISSUE IS MOOT. 
Mountain Fuel alleges that the Commission has erred in 
refusing to consider a future test period in this case and 
requests that the Court remand the issue to the Commission with 
instructions to require the Commission to consider a future test 
period. The Company's request does not specify what test period 
that would be. The forecasted test period Mountain Fuel wanted 
the Commission to consider in this case no longer exists. 
Mountain Fuel has nowhere requested that the Commission be 
8
 State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499-50 (Utah 1986); Bradford 
v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Utah 1980); Downey State Bank 
v. Maior-Blakenev Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978). 
8 
ordered to consider on remand what is now historical data and 
retroactively set rates. Mountain Fuel can only be asking the 
Court to order the Commission in the future to permit Mountain 
Fuel as a matter of legal right to present whatever forecasted 
test period data it wishes and to make findings.9 That request 
is very simply a request for an advisory opinion from the 
Court.10 
9
 In its Application for Rehearing, Mountain Fuel stated 
specifically that it did not want the Commission in this case to 
order a future test year: 
The Company is not requesting that the Commission 
reopen the record in this case to establish a future test 
year. To do so would only worsen the effects of 
regulatory lag that the Report and Order has created. 
However, the Commission should modify the Report and 
Order to recognize that the test-year determination 
should be made only after the applicant for rate relief 
and other interested parties have presented evidence 
concerning the state of the economy.... (emphasis added) 
R. at 2105. 
10
 The Utah Supreme Court has a judicial policy against 
rendering advisory opinions: 
Because of a longstanding judicial policy in Utah to 
avoid advisory opinion, we do not generally consider 
mooted questions on appeal.... "The function of appellate 
courts, like that of courts generally, is not to give 
opinions on merely abstract or theoretical matters, but 
only to decide actual controversies injuriously affecting 
the rights of some party to the litigation, and it has 
been held that questions or cases which have become moot 
or academic are not a proper subject of review." 
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah App. 1990), guoting 
MacRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974). But see, 
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P. 2d 896 (Utah 1981), where the Court 
recognized an exception to the mootness rule where the issue "is of 
wide concern, affects the public interest, is likely to recur in a 
similar manner, and, because of the brief time any one person is 
affected, would otherwise likely escape judicial review." JTd. at 
899 (citations omitted). In order to qualify for the exception, 
all four of the tests must be met. The exception would not apply 
to the instant case because the issue is of concern only to the 
(continued...) 
9 
C. THE COMMISSION TOOK INTO ACCOUNT ECONOMIC 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN DECIDING TO USE AN HISTORIC TEAR 
YEAR AND PRECLUDE FORECASTED FIGURES. 
Mountain Fuel argues that the Commission arbitrarily 
rejected the Company's petition to submit a projected test year. 
That argument ignores several significant factors. First, this 
particular rate proceeding was initiated at Commission request. 
Mountain Fuel had not filed a rate case for over five years. 
Since a for-profit company such as Mountain Fuel will never 
ignore the bottom line in dealing with consumers, it is safe to 
conclude that the most significant reason why Mountain Fuel 
didn't file a rate case for so many years (in fact it has still 
not done so despite its allegations of mistreatment by the 
Commission in this case) is that economic conditions have been 
stable and the utility's rates adequate to cover expenses and 
return profits to shareholders. The Commission noted that fact 
in determining to use an historic test year. What the Commission 
wanted to learn out of this proceeding was whether or not a rate 
reduction might be justified; whether or not Mountain Fuel's 
costs should actually be lower than they were, especially given 
the extent of Mountain Fuel's affiliate relationships and in 
particular its dependence for gas supply upon its affiliate 
parent, Questar.n 
10(. . .continued) 
Company and could be resolved through either an interlocutory 
appeal or a request for a declaratory ruling. 
11
 Report and Order issued November 21, 1960 at 3-7. R. at 
1965-7. Order on Application for Rehearing issued January 10, 1991 
at 3. R. at 2163. 
10 
Second, the Commission took administrative notice of the 
fact that the rate of inflation had been consistently low for 
quite some time, suggesting that costs and investor expectations 
were relatively level, if not declining.12 
What the Commission wished to avoid was extensive and time-
consuming debate and argument in the case about the accuracy of 
forecasted data.13 While it is true that the Division of Public 
Utilities was willing to have Mountain Fuel submit forecasted 
data, it would necessarily have to analyze that data and 
doubtless would contest Mountain Fuel's accuracy on some or many 
points as it has in the past. Clearly, if economic conditions had 
been as volatile as they were for example in the mid-1970s and 
early 1980s, and Mountain Fuel had so argued, the Commission 
would have allowed the submission of the forecasted test period. 
In summary, Mountain Fuel simply failed to argue 
persuasively that the time and effort required for the use of a 
forecasted test period were justified given revailing economic 
circumstances. 
D. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF § 54-4-4(3) GIVES THE 
COMMISSION DISCRETION TO ADOPT OR NOT ADOPT A 
FORECASTED TEST YEAR.1* 
Mountain Fuel argues that as a matter of legal right it is 
entitled to submit a forecasted test period and the Commission 
12
 R. at 39-40. 
13
 Report and Order issued November 21, 1990 at 3. R. at 1965. 
1A
 The Committee does not participate in this section of the 
Brief. It does, however, join in the arguments on mootness and 
failure to proffer. 
11 
must consider it. The plain language of the statute says 
otherwise: 
(3) The Commission, in its determination of just and 
reasonable rates, may consider recent changes in the 
utility's financial condition...and may adopt an 
appropriate future test period.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(3) (1990). In effect Mountain Fuel is 
arguing that "may" actually means "shall." A more reasonable 
interpretation of 54-4-4(3), given the circumstances of the 
passage of the legislation, is that an historical test period 
based on hard historical data is the normal or default test 
period to be used.15 The burden is on the utility to show that 
general economic circumstances are sufficiently unstable as to 
warrant the use of forecasted data. In short, before the 
Commission elects to consider forecasted data, it would need to 
find first that the state of the economy required consideration 
of speculative future factors in order to justify a departure 
from the safety and reliability of hard historical data. In this 
case Mountain Fuel did not meet that burden. As the Commission 
stated on page 7 of its November 21, 1990 Order in this Docket: 
In future proceedings, the Commission will decide 
15
 The general rule is that "may" is discretionary and "shall" 
mandatory. See Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 485 P.2d 1035, 1036-7 
(Utah 1971); Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake 
County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983). 
The only exception to the rule is where it is clear from the 
context that the legislature intended otherwise. § 54-4-4(3) was 
passed by the Legislature in 1975 with the support of the 
Commission and at the request of public utility companies to allow 
the Commission to deal more effectively with high inflation and 
rapid increases in costs. It was never intended to require the 
Commission to consider evidence of a future test year during stable 
economic periods in which there was low inflation. 
12 
issues concerning test year, rate base, out-of-
period adjustments, and related matters prior to 
the onset of hearings and based on the then 
existing conditions of the utility and the economy 
in which it is operating.16 (emphasis added,) 
PART II. AVERAGE VERSUS YEAR-END RATE BASE. 
Standard of Review on Rate Base Issue, The term "rate base" 
is not used in the Public Utilities Code (Utah Code Ann. § 54-1-
1, et seq.). The following sections, however, speak broadly 
about valuation of a utility's assets: § 54-4-4(3) (the 
Commission may consider recent or reasonably expected future 
changes in the utility's "investments"); § 54-4-21 (the 
Commission has the power to value a utility's property); and § 
54-7-19 (the procedure for valuation of utilities). The only 
judicially imposed limitations on the Commission's power to 
determine rate base in Utah are procedural due process and that 
the rate established be just and reasonable.17 
Other than the question of whether there was "substantial 
evidence" to support the Commission's decision, it is apparent 
that on issues relating to the valuation of rate base the 
Commission's "expertise gleaned from its accumulated practical, 
first-hand experience with the subject matter"18 is fundamental. 
With the exception of reviewing the quantum of evidence the Court 
16
 R. at 1969, 2163. 
17
 Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 107 Utah 155, 
152 P.2d 542, 555 (1944). 
18
 Morton Intern. Inc. v. Auditing Div. , 814 P.2d 581, 587 
(Utah 1991) . 
13 
should, therefore, grant considerable deference to the 
Commission's findings and conclusions in this area.19 
A. SINCE MOUNTAIN FUEL HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN OF 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE, THE COMMISSION'S 
FINDINGS ARE CONCLUSIVE. 
Mountain Fuel argues that the Commission's order to use an 
average rather than a year-end rate base is not based on 
sufficient record evidence. Rule 11(3)(e)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure requires that: 
[I]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary 
to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the 
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusion. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1991) permits a court to grant 
relief on appeal if: 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court. 
In Boston First Nat, v. Salt Lake Ctv. Bd., the Utah Supreme 
Court interpreted this provision of Utah's Administrative 
Procedures Act: 
An appellate court applying the "substantial evidence 
test" must consider both the evidence that supports the 
Tax Commission's factual findings and the evidence that 
detracts from the findings (citations omitted). 
Nevertheless, the party challenging the findings—in 
this case, the taxpayer—must marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite 
the supporting facts, the Tax Commission's findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence (note omitted). 
799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). If an appellant fails to meet 
19
 JId. at 586-7. See also Savage Brothers Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission, 723 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986). 
14 
its burden of marshalling the evidence, "the Board's findings of 
operative facts are conclusive."20 In Heinecke v. Dept. of 
Commerce,21 the Utah Court of Appeals chided the appellant for 
marshalling not only the evidence supporting the Division's 
findings, but reviewing in minute detail all the evidence before 
the Board and "emphasizing the evidence that supported his 
position," leaving it to the court "to sort out what evidence 
actually supported the findings" (emphasis in original).22 
These cases require that Mountain Fuel not only designate 
the relevant record for appeal, but also gather together and 
refer in its Opening Brief to all of the evidence supporting the 
Commission's findings and then show that that evidence is not 
"substantial."23 As detailed below, Mountain Fuel not only 
failed to cite the record evidence supporting the Commission's 
findings on average versus year-end rate base, it failed to 
20
 Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 441 
(Utah App. 1989). See also Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 
447, 450 (Utah App. 1991). 
21
 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 1991). 
22
 Id.. In a note, the Court stated: 
Evidence contrary to the findings becomes relevant when 
the court scrutinizes the supporting evidence under the 
"substantial evidence viewed in light of the whole 
record" test (reference omitted), but this is a distinct 
and subsequent analytic step (citation omitted)(emphasis 
in original). 
23
 Although the cases leave some room for dispute on the 
precise meaning of "substantial evidence," it is clear that it is 
something more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance. 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-8 (Utah App. 
1989); First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of Egualization, 799 P.2d 
1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). 
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request that the greater part of that evidence be designated as 
part of the record on appeal. 
In the hearings before the Commission, the only party 
recommending an average rate base was the Committee. The 
Committee's witness on this issue was Michael Arndt, a Certified 
Public Accountant with 16 years' experience in public utility 
accounting. R. at 2414-16. Mr. Arndt presented the following 
testimony on the average versus year-end rate base issue: Direct 
Testimony (R. at 2620-22); Rebuttal Testimony (R. at 2590-92); 
Surrebuttal Testimony (R. at 2569-74); and he testified on the 
stand on that issue (R. at 652-5, 657-8, 673, 680-5, 686-91, 695-
99, 715-18). Mountain Fuel did not designate any of these forty 
pages as part of the record on appeal,2A and referred to only 
two of these pages in its Brief.25 The Division of Public 
Utilities also presented evidence on the average versus year-end 
rate base issue.26 The testimony of Division witness Mary 
24
 See R. at 2247-8 for Mountain Fuel's designation of the 
record for appeal. The Committee requested that the evidence 
presented by Mr. Arndt be designated part of the record for appeal. 
See July 9, 19 91 letter from Kent Walgren, Attorney for the 
Committee, to Stephen C. Hewlett, Commission Secretary. Appendix 
3. 
25
 See Mountain Fuel's Opening Brief at 32 (statement of the 
Committee position) and at 38 (brief summary of the Committee 
position). The two references to the record are: R. at 654, 680. 
26
 Carl L. Mower: Surrebuttal (R. at 2404-25); Stand (R. at 
84-101, 483-512). Chester Sullivant: Direct (R. at 2470-75); 
Exhibit 1.12 (R. at 2448); Surrebuttal (R. at 2454-8); Stand (R. at 
519-20, 527, 531-40). Mary Cleveland: Surrebuttal (R. at 2902-
05); Stand (R. at 625-34, 640-47); Exhibit 6.4 (R. at 2936-43). 
In Mountain Fuel's letter of July 5, 1991 to the Commission 
Secretary designating portions of the record to be transmitted to 
(continued...) 
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Cleveland, part of which supports the Commission's findings in 
this area, was neither designated for appeal by Mountain Fuel, 
nor mentioned in its Brief.27 
The critical problem with use of a year-end rate base is 
that adjustments must be made to company investment, revenues and 
expenses in order to "synchronize" the test-year.28 The total 
revenues and expenses for the twelve months of a test year are in 
effect automatically averaged.29 Thus if a year-end rate base 
is used, as proposed by Mountain Fuel, expenses and revenues must 
also be adjusted to year-end levels. To the extent that 
increasing revenues are not synchronized with an increasing year-
26( . . .continued) 
the Supreme Court (R. at 2247-8) the testimony of Mary Cleveland, 
the importance of which is discussed below, was excluded. The 
Division had to request that Ms. Cleveland's testimony be 
designated part of the record for appeal. See Appendix 3. 
27
 R. at 2247-8. The Direct, Surrebuttal and Exhibits of Ms. 
Cleveland were made a part of the record by the Division. See 
letter dated July 10, 1991 from Laurie Noda, the Division's 
attorney, to Stephen C. Hewlett, Commission Secretary. Appendix 3. 
28
 This Court has acknowledged the requirement that a test year 
be synchronized: 
The commission may adjust all figures, revenue, expense, 
and investment for anticipated changes, but it may not 
•adjust one side or part of the equation without adjusting 
the other; unless there is a finding the particular 
expense is extraordinary. 
Utah Dept. of Business Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 
1242, 1248 (Utah 1980), quoting City of Los Angeles v. Public 
Utilities Comm'n, 497 P.2d 785, 797 (1972).. 
29
 I.e. , whether revenues and expenses during the test year are 
going up or down, the effect of totaling them for the 12 months of 
the test year is to effectively arrive at an average number for the 
year. 
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end rate base, the utility will receive a windfall. 
Mountain Fuel argues in its Brief that by using an average 
rate-base, the Commission understated the Company's rate-base by 
$9,542,000,31 the revenue effect of which is an understatement 
of approximately $1,421,758.32 In addition to taking the 
$9,542,000 figure from an exhibit which has not been designated 
part of this record for appeal,33 Mountain Fuel nowhere mentions 
in its Brief that there was evidence before the Commission that 
the Company's revenues were increasing throughout the test-year: 
The Company filed its case using a year end rate 
30
 The "windfall" occurs because the test year does not take 
into account increased revenues that the company actually receives. 
For example, if, as here, rate-base is increasing and expenses are 
constant (R. at 644, 646), but the number of customers (and fuel 
consumption) is increasing throughout the test-year, revenues would 
have to be adjusted (moved six months forward) in order to "match" 
the rate base and expenses. The more matching required, the 
greater the impetus to move the test period forward six months. 
Mower, Surrebuttal, 8/31/90, R. at 15. In this case, the Division 
recommended that if the Commission were to accept the Company's 
proposed post-test year adjustments, the test-year be "rolled" 
forward six months. Mower Surrebuttal, 8/31/90, R. at 2419. When 
asked by Commissioner Byrne what that would entail, Mr. Mower 
stated that it would take "a month or so" to update all of the 
numbers. Mower, Redirect, 9/10/90, R. at 485. Mr. Mower testified 
that because the Commission had ordered a 1989 historical test-
year, the Division had concentrated its auditing on the 1989 
calendar year and had not examined 1990 data in detail. Mower 
Surrebuttal, 9/31/90, R. at 2415; Mower , Stand, 9/10/90, R. at 
485-6; Mower, Stand, 9/5/90, R. at 100-01. 
31
 Opening Brief at 36. 
32
 The revenue impact is obtained by multiplying $9,542,000 by 
the overall rate of return (11.03%) and a tax gross-up factor of 
1.351. 
33
 The Company obtains its figure of $9,54 2,000 from page 9, 
line 4, of Joint Exhibit 2, dated September 26, 1990. Joint 
Exhibit 2 is part of the evidence which Mountain Fuel did not 
designate as part of the record in this appeal. R. at 2247-8. 
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base and certain expenses annualized to the end of year 
levels. The Company did not attempt to calculate 
revenues on year end levels.3A 
The result is that in the rate hearing the Company was proposing 
an unsynchronized test year that failed to take into account the 
increase in customer levels and revenues between July 1, 1989 and 
December 31, 1989. Although the Company claimed that long-term 
trends indicated that its new customers were using less fuel than 
existing customers, that assertion was convincingly disputed by 
Division witness Mary Cleveland.35 
The above referenced record evidence, all of which is 
essential in order to reach a reasoned decision on the issue of 
average versus year-end rate base, was neither designated part of 
the record for appeal by Mountain Fuel nor discussed anywhere in 
its Brief. 
B. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION TO USE AN AVERAGE 
RATE BASE IS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
In its Report and Order,36 the Commission gave the 
following reasons for its decision to use average rather than 
year-end rate base: 
3A
 Division of Public Utilities Statement Concerning the Use 
of a Year End Test Year, September 5, 1990, sponsored by Carl 
Mower. R. at 2422-25, 2404-21, 483-512, esp. at 2424, 2414-15, 
483-4. The "certain expenses" annualized to year-end levels 
(December 31, 1989) were wage and labor overhead expenses. The 
Commission approved these increased expenses, which totaled 
$1,027,000. Report and Order issued November 21, 1990, at 13 (R. 
at 1975). 
35
 R. at 625, 631, 633-4, 640-1. See also Mr. Sullivant's 
testimony on the stand: R. at 533. 
36
 Report and Order issued November 21, 1990 at pp. 3-10 (R. 
at 1956-72). 
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1. There was no need for attrition adjustments because the 
rate of inflation was low and Mountain Fuel's rates had been 
stable or declining since 1985.37 
2. The Commission had relied on average rate base in recent 
U S West and Utah Power and Light dockets and Mountain Fuel 
produced no compelling reason to depart from that practice, R. at 
1970. 
3. Average rate base matches with annual flows of revenues 
and expenses. R. at 1970. Year-end rate base requires 
substantial, difficult adjustments to revenues and expenses, 
fraught with policy implications. R. at 1970. 
4. Year-end rate base, "a mere snapshot", gives a 
potentially misleading picture of rate base at a given point in 
time. R. at 1970. 
The following record evidence supports the Commission's 
findings: 
1. Lack of need for an attrition adjustment: Transcript, 
Nov. 21, 1989 (R. at 39-40); Sullivant Surrebuttal (R. at 2456); 
Arndt Surrebuttal (R. at 2572-3); Arndt, Stand (R. at 673, 717). 
2. Consistency with practice toward other utilities: Arndt 
Direct (R. at 2621); Arndt Rebuttal (R. at 2573); Arndt, Stand 
(R. at 685); Mower, Stand, 9/10/90 (R. at 497). 
3. Average rate base matches revenues and expenses; year-
end rate base requires difficult adjustments: Arndt Direct (R. 
37
 R. at 1965-66. The Commission also noted that the Company 
had not sought rate relief since 1985. 
20 
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(R. fit 6 5 4 , 7 1 5 - 6 ) ; Mower , S t a n d 8 / 3 1 / 9 0 iR, at; ? 4 2 0 - 1 ) ; D i v i s i o n 
n! i inilil \c 111 i I i t U'i ' ,' f a t enifjii1 on Ave iag t w Y e a r End R a t e Ra<rt: 
(K , d 1 24 2 5 ) ; Mowei , bLand 9 , J U / 9 0 ( H , a 1 4 B y i , L" 1 e v e l a n d , b t d 111J 
(R. a t 6 2 7 ) • 
i : \ i ' i f j o f *•-•  r 1 1 i i"i I! I y 
misleading: Mower, StanG b -. - r - . . lower, Stai id, 
9/10/ur ~>r:ri* . Stand 
• -::.:; . - - :he Di vi si oi l 
supporting the Committee's position and tl le Commission's decision 
was offered by uivxs±oi i witness Mower. - response to a question 
from Chairman Stewart, Mr Mower testif:- : ::.-t even thougl I the 
Division was "official ly" recommending a year-end rate base, 1 I i s 
p e r s o n a ] c p ::i i :i i ::> i i wa s : - • : 
Com> Stewart: Again, Mr. Mower, you are answering 
questions about matching. Matching is an issue that we 
will talk about later. I'm asking you as a senior 
regulator in this state, one who has been around longer 
than just about anybody in this room, if you had your 
choice between an average test year and the year end 
test year , whi cl I would yen i select i i :t advance of a case? 
The Witness (Mr. Mower): I would feel most 
comfortable with an average test year, but in this case 
we feel that we have made those reasonable calculations 
to take it to year end. 
Com. Stewart; Do you think the data then that is 
presented by the Division to the Commission, by all of 
your arguments regarding matching, is going to give us 
as accurate information as if we had selected an 
average test year at the beginning and instructed 1 
parties to deal with an average test year? 
The Witness (Mr. Mower): The calculations that we 
have made show that there would not be much difference 
in the revenue requirement from what we are 
recommending on a year end basis to what it woi i 1 :i I: »e • DI I 
2] 
an average basis even if you update the test year to 
more current data. 
R. at 86-7. Finally, even Mountain Fuel offered evidence 
supporting the Committee recommendation and Commission decision. 
Company witness James L. Balthaser sponsored an exhibit which 
showed that the states of Washington, Montana, Louisiana, 
Tennessee, Maine, South Dakota, Iowa and New Hampshire all use an 
historic test year with an average rate base.38 
C. EVEN IF THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ORDERING AVERAGE RATE 
BASE, MOUNTAIN FIJEL HAS NOT SHOWN SUBSTANTIAL 
PREJUDICE. 
Section 63-46b-16(4) (1991) of Utah's Administrative 
Procedures Act permits the Court to grant relief "only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced" based upon a 
determination of fact that is not supported by substantial 
evidence. 
The weight of evidence establishes that whether one uses an 
average or year-end rate base, once revenues are synchronized, 
the revenue requirement of the Company is approximately the 
same,39 According to Division witness Mary Cleveland, 
annualization of customer use to December 31, 1989 (year-end), 
38
 James L. Balthaser Exhibit No. 6.20. Since this exhibit was 
neither designated part of the record on appeal, nor marshaled by 
the Company as evidence supporting the Commission's findings, it is 
included herein as Appendix 4. 
39
 Mower, Surrebuttal, August 31, 1990. R. at 2419. Mower, 
Stand, 9/10/90. R- at 505, 508. Mower, Stand, 9/5/90. R. at 87. 
Sullivant, Surrebuttal, August 31, 1990. R. at 2457-8. Sullivant, 
Stand. R. at 520, 531, 533-4, 538. 
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; aer t • .h.;:\ ompare that number to the revenue impact 
(shortfal i- which Mountain Fuel claims resulted 
from ^r . commissi-.r. ^ .^
 w: an average rate base, depreciation 
must also hi z : ,:r;^-. v^ai --nc Ie\- & * :.«- the $527,000 
in in i ! H [ ~ * -
shortfa ., . - -*t . .*-t wj.t-:, : evenue impai + . t ;,: -~~ ~~*:o 
account : .• Commissic <- u~- f average rate base resulted ... 
• ^dditiona^ • - . a ii i , F i ie] " • That cai l 
hardly ;-r deemed substantia, prejudice. 
PARrI i ; . •>.* > . .. RETURN PENALTY 
Standard of Review on Rate of Return Penalty Issue, 
Mountain f-j*" - argument that the Commission lacks authority \ 
ordt ' - * • 
applies ...... ;.: * >_ rau > ; :> .: , owever, the 
Commissior. s findings -^ - er.ti*:e:i *.- deference 
A. WITHIN A ZONE OF REASONABLENESS, THE COMMISSION HAS 
BROAD AUTHORITY TO SET A UTILITY'S RATE OF RETURN. 
; -• _ r . . :,f.s nn inherent 
Exhibit DPU u . JL , rev . ( I U U I uiaa, LUIumn E) . R. 5906 • 
A1
 The two items which must be added back into rate base to 
arrive at year-end levels are depreciation ($250,000) and 
production-related depreciation ($277,000). Joint Exhibit 3, pp. 
23-4. These two pages, which were not designated part of the 
record : r appeal, are attached hereto as Appendix 5. 
3
 Morton Intern., Inc. v. Auditing Div. , 8 ] 4 P. 2d 581, 587 
pt -• ' 1991) . 
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authority to impose a penalty*4 to rate of return and that the 
Commission has limited powers to impose penalties and other 
punitive measures/5 The Company, however, fails to address the 
fact that the Commission's 12.1% rate of return was within the 
range of rates established by expert testimony;46 nor does it 
argue that the return resulted in unjust or unreasonable rates. 
Respondent and Intervenors contend that the Commission has 
broad discretion to set a utility's rate of return as long as it 
is within a range of reasonableness. Section 54-4-4(1) of Utah's 
Public Utility Code provides that the Commission has the 
authority to determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates 
of a utility. Section 54-3-1 describes what the Commission can 
take into account in determining a just and reasonable rate: 
The scope of definition "just and reasonable" may 
include, but shall not be limited to, the cost of 
providing service to each category of customer, 
economic impact of charges on each category of 
customer, and on the well-being of the state of Utah; 
methods of reducing wide periodic variations in demand 
of such products, commodities or services, and means of 
AA
 At pages 40 and 41 of its Opening Brief, Mountain Fuel 
argues that the use of the term "penalty" by the Commission in the 
Table of Contents of its November 21, 1990 Report and Order is 
somehow significant. It is clear from the Order itself, however, 
that even if the Commission had used the term "penalty" (rather 
than adjustment) throughout its Order, that term would have been 
intended in its generic sense of a "disadvantage, loss, or 
hardship" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 846 (1977)), and not 
in the narrow sense in which it is used in Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-7-
24 through -29 (1990). 
A5
 Petitioner's Opening Brief, page 40. 
A6
 Mountain Fuel did not request that any of the record 
testimony or evidence dealing with rate of return be designated 
part of the record for appeal—not even that of its own witness J. 
Peter Williamson. R. at 2247-8. This issue is dealt with below. 
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encouraging conservation > t rHbourceb diiii ineiyy. 
(emphasis added) 
Utah Code Ann ; . : : ough tY e :., e 11;i rate of 
return" is nowhere specifically mentioned, the Court has 
recognized that * ' ~ Commission may look at various facn-i;, in 
r<~ t return In Utah Power and Light Co. 
v. Public Service Commission47 (Utah Power • , r* semina 1 case i :n 
which the Utah Supreme i' •.  i IHIPTII Unit* 
St at e s Suprerne Court cases de a 1in g w j 1. h rate o£ re t u r n / 8 t his 
Court stated: 
The Hope case stands squarely for the doctrine that it 
is the final impact of the rate order which is 
controlling insofar as Federal constitutional 
limitations are concerned. So long as the rate set 
does not confiscate the property devoted to public 
service, the rate order will not be held to violate 
substantive constitutional principles. The legislature 
is free to determine its own economic policy in regard 
to the fixing of rates, Its power to set rates is, 
however, still circumscribed by two constitutional 
limitations: (1) substantive constitutional law 
requires that the rates finally set shall not be 
confiscatory; and (2) the requirements of procedural 
due process must still be followed. 
1 5 1 1". 2(i a t l:/'i .'i This principle, which Is "known as the ""end 
result doctrine," has become a bedrock of public* utility law in 
the Un i I H I Ptafp;-* i|IJI In I lie Commission's 
r
1
 15? P 2d 54? ) . 
A8
 Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. , 315 U.S. 
575, 62 S.Ct. 736 (1942); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas 
Co., 320 U.S. 591 , 64 S.Ct, 281 (1944). 
A9
 The notion that a rate is just and reasonable if it permits 
the utility to "recover its costs of service and a reasonable 
return on the value of property devoted to public use" has been 
reaffirmed bv - r.: s Court more recently in Utah Dep ; t of Business 
(conti nued. ) 
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duties with regard to rate of return, the Court in Utah Power 
went on to state: 
What annual rate will constitute just compensation 
depends upon many circumstances, and must be determined 
by the exercise of a fair and enlightened judgment, 
having regard to all relevant facts...The return should 
be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the 
financial soundness of the utility and should be 
adequate, under efficient and economical management, to 
maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise 
the money necessary for the proper discharge of its 
public duties. 
152 P.2d at 568. 
What is critically absent in Mountain Fuel's appeal of the 
Commission's decision relating to the rate of return adjustment 
is any argument or evidence that the reduction in rate of return 
from 12.2% to 12.1% resulted in rates which were confiscatory or 
otherwise illegal. The Company argues that because the 
legislature has nowhere given the Commission specific statutory 
authority to adjust rate of return as a way of addressing 
mismanagement of affiliate relations, the Commission is limited 
to disallowing certain expenses.50 The issue, however, is not 
whether the Commission has authority to set a rate of return. 
Even though "rate of return" is nowhere mentioned in the Public 
Utility Code, Mountain Fuel does not dispute the Commission's 
49( . . .continued) 
Regulation v. Public Service Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1242, 1249 (Utah 
1980). See also, American Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co., 748 P.2d 
1060, 1063 (Utah 1987) . 
50
 Opening Brief at 41. In Utah Power, the Court stated that 
the Commission could make an adjustment for Utah Power & Light's 
expenses of issuing and selling preferred stock by either adjusting 
the company's rate base or making an adjustment in rate of return. 
152 P.2d at 562. 
26 
w 
power *' set - return "• 
argument - r ° manner 
dec r--
limi r a * 1 or, * * r - manner : ^:.. cJ- r it t 
that it re?- • .OL emu - v. • 
process t>- , nforded and ^ *-.-. 





mismanagement. I.- i~ta;.e supreme c. 
Hawaii, have stated that -r - , * *-<= 
K - *~ «- )r 
rdered because 
V 
and \-v, Mexicc a:.; .ntermediate state cour* futr, Dakota, 
have held that a idle : return may nui u& iuweiea uec-..^ "* f 
utility ine::-ciency.' ^ree state supreme courts, Louisiana, 
New Hampshire and Florida, have held that a higher return on 
The United States Supreme Court has suggested that "the 
right to earn a fair return [may] be limited by the requirement 
that reasonable efficiency be exercised." State ex rel, 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission , 167 
U.S. 276, 312, 43 S. Ct. 544, 555 (1923). 
53
 North Carolina ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. General Teleph. 
Co. of the Southeast, 208 S.E.2d 681 (No. Carolina 1974); 
Application of Kauai Elec. Division, Etc., 590 P. 2d 524 (Hawaii 
1978). 
5U
 South Central Bell Teleph. Co. v. Kentucky Utilities Comm'n, 
637 S.W.2d 649 (Kentucky 1982); General Teleph. Co. of the 
Southwest v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 652 P.2d 1200 (New 
Mexico 1982); Re Northwestern Bell Teleph. Co., 3 PUR4th 473 
(] 973) . 
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equity may be granted for utility efficiency.55 No state 
supreme court has prohibited a commission from ordering a higher 
return on equity because of efficiency.56 
Respondent and Intervenors believe that the best view is 
that a utility commission's decision on rate of return should be 
upheld as it is within a range of reasonableness.57 In a recent 
Utah Power & Light rate case, the Utah Commission acknowledged 
that an increase in the rate of return may be appropriate for 
utility efficiency: 
.•.we recognize that management performance is an 
appropriate factor for the Commission to consider in 
LaSalle Teleph. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 157 
So.2d 455 (Louisiana 1963); New England Teleph. and Telegr. Co. v. 
New Hampshire, 183 A. 2d 237 (New Hampshire 1962); Gulf Power Co. v. 
Cresse, 410 So.2d 492 (Florida 1982). 
56
 State utility commissions are likewise divided on 
adjustments to rate of return for either utility efficiency or 
inefficiency. The commissions of Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Virginia, Missouri, California and Iowa 
have granted both higher returns for efficiency and lower returns 
for inefficiency. The commissions of Arkansas, Illinois, Texas, 
Vermont, North Carolina and Idaho have ordered lower rates of 
return for utility inefficiency. The commissions of New Mexico, 
New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania have awarded higher rates of return 
for utility efficiency. See PUR Digest, 3d Series, Return, § 36. 
The New Hampshire commission explicitly refused to order a higher 
rate of return for utility efficiency on the theory that the 
utility "should not be rewarded for what it is supposed to do 
anyway." Re Gas Service, Inc., 69 NH PUC 291, DR 83-345, 
Supplemental Order No. 17,061 dated June 4, 1984, cited at PUR 
Digest, 3d Series, § 36, Return, at p. 1000. 
57
 The range of reasonableness determined by the Commission was 
from 11.6% to something less than 13%. Order on Application for 
Rehearing issued January 10, 1991, at 4. R. at 2164. The 
Commission's authorized return of 12.1% was within that range. 
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settinq a return on equity within a reasonable 
range. 
There i s a compelling public policy reason for upholding the 
Commission in adjusting rate of return for either efficiency or 
mismanagement , I n (•: »M-> I >• ma jor rvj t e proceeding expert w.i 1::i lesses 
(usually economists) are hired to present testimony on rate of 
return it is invariably the case that, the expert; used by the 
ciM'iniiiieitds a luiyho] ta\ e >1 letui n than the experts who 
test::- o behalf of the Division of Public Utilities and 
Committee of Consumer Services. As a result, the roniniissi 
, _ ,„ -vina & x + :^r . . „, < J range : ; ^ c .: letui . *i 
the Court prohibits the Commission from expli/:* . \ c:atir t'.?; 
J.L ua& orderec
 r-
because of / . x.ij luismanagemem Vier- . * : . - v. dete: tr>-
Commission from sub silentio doing the same *\*: it wuuiu seem 
that 1: c th ti ie . •„- :.<_.: ter served by 
the Commission bein ; .*ilowed \* c i ^ -r message to a II 1 
parties on a] ] of the r easons underl\ 
SINCE MOUNTAIN FUEL FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE ON RATE OF RETURN, THE COMMISSION 
FINDINGS ARE CONCLUSIVE. 
Mountai*: Fue- ! a n e u tu • *- ^ 
return--ever :;..:: \: i+p ow^ .. ii.t-tr Peter - iiamson 
58
 Docket No. 89-035-10 Report and Order issued February 9, 
1990. It should be noted, however, that even though the Commission 
expressed this policy statement, it refused to grant an upward 
adjustment in UP&L's rate of return for efficient management in. 
this instance. Report and Order at 12. 
39
 See Mountain Fuel's July b, 19 9 1 lettei to Commission 
Secretary Stephen C . Hewlet t R , a t. 2 74 7 •  8 . 
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The only evidence which is before this Court on rate of return is 
that of Division witness Nile Eatmon and Committee witness 
Mattiyahu Marcus. The Division and the Committee (not the 
Company) requested that this evidence be certified for appeal.60 
Further, Mountain Fuel did not marshal the evidence of Division 
witnesses Phillip Teumim, Robert Parente or Michael Harrison, or 
Committee witnesses Richard Galligan, Thomas Catlin or Jerry 
Mierzwa, all of whom offered testimony which was used by the 
Commission to justify its rate of return adjustment.61 For the 
reasons stated in Part II.A. above, the Commission's findings on 
rate of return are conclusive. 
C. THE COMMISSION'S ADJUSTMENT TO RATE OF RETURN 
WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Mountain Fuel's argument that the Commission had no 
evidentiary basis for finding that Mountain Fuel's customers were 
adversely affected by what it perceived as an undesirable 
corporate structure is inaccurate.62 The Commission stated in 
its order that it was concerned that affiliate relationships have 
constrained and inhibited the pursuit of a least-cost gas supply 
60
 See Appendix 3. 
61
 The Division witnesses were consultants from Theodore Barry 
and Assc. and the Committee witnesses were consultants from Exeter 
and Assc. 
62
 In addition to the testimony cited below, three Committee 
witnesses from Exeter: Richard Galligan, Thomas Catlin and Jerry 
Mierzwa, testified on September 18, 1990 about the problems caused 
by Mountain Fuel's affiliate relationships. Even though the 
Commission relied on this evidence for some of its findings (R. at 
1996-2005), none of this testimony is part of the record on appeal. 
30 
plan by Mountain Fuel,tlj Division witness Phillip Teurnim stated 
in '"li reel tes t. imony t, hat Mountain F'ue I " s control over Questar 
Pipeline's performance of the gas supply function was minimal and 
that, - a number -. : cases, Questar Pipeline's policy" decisions-
•- . . - appeared to be contrary to the best interests of the 
customers c: Mountain Fuel.. He concluded: 
Due to '.: ese management deficiencies, Mountain Fuel 
cannot be assured that iz is paying WEXPRO and Questar 
Pipeline only for services which are appropriately 
charged to the utility, that such services are 
efficiently performed, and that the services are 
performed in such a way as to minimize the costs to 
Mountain Fuel customers. 
R at 2736 division v-.tnes? Wes Huntsman also noted affi-iav*-
problems •. . = direc* t <"-sLiiiiony ana statt .-• : s 
ar i cingeiT',: - . , • i sprvice with * *^ ^::, ...ctes we.- v:.t 
the result cr uompetit . -e bidding an,: * n.-- Mountain Fuel -. : 
given preference • •- - — .6A 
Referring to these a i : , _ a i e problems , \ 4 - *- :-;*-. 
Commission found that K ; I P T >: . • * * «- record stror : • .-UJ .--*.-
"a deliberate s * .- * ,rporati^n o p e r a t i c ^ 
generally to th- ^ s t : - :«..t; or. ; - _ i : \ ,:;K, . :,- - :t .-uFtor- -
 vi.. 
at 1992-3) and tnar K* nta.r p .> personne. 
techn J c::a.l uncle 1 - . *. nppiy r » ..- model a:, . ;-
use by Questar Pipeline, and that Mount -1 '> -lt- management lacked 
oversight and control of Questar Pi. > I J ^  M 8 . 
63
 Report: and Order issued November 21, 1990 at 36- n. di 
2 9 9 B 
b
" F. at 2 549. 
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The Commission further found that while Questar Pipeline's 
rates and rate structure can adversely affect Mountain Fuel and 
its core customers, Mountain Fuel never intervened to represent 
its customers' interests at the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) where such rates are determined. R at 1993. 
Mountain Fuel testified that it did not appear in FERC 
proceedings because it did not want to be at odds with its sister 
affiliate Questar Pipeline and because that "doesn't carry out 
the fiduciary responsibility to the shareholders" of Questar 
Corporation. R at 1173. 
The Commission also revalued portions of a real estate 
transaction between Mountain Fuel and its affiliate, Interstate 
Land. The Commission found that this transaction placed 
ratepayers at a disadvantage that could not be entirely 
controlled or offset. R. at 1979-80. This concern about the 
lack of arms length negotiating between Mountain Fuel and its 
affiliates was at the heart of the Commission's decision to 
reduce Petitioner's rate of return.65 Mountain Fuel seems 
displeased that the Commission is determined to examine the 
general corporate structure of Questar Corporation.66 General 
regulatory principles however, require that a Commission strictly 
65
 See Report and Order issued November 21, 1990 at 17-20, 34-
43. R. at 1979-1982, 1996-2005. 
66
 See Petitioner's Opening Brief, page 43, footnote 32. 
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scrutinize a f f i 1 i at *» I fr-inscirt inns aim I i e 1.11.1 mush 1 ps , 
CONCLUSION 
Careful review and an^iypiH r Appellant's arguments and 
dnt hut I t les 1 uvud i s t h . . upportr Appellant's claims 
that the Commission erred on i.^t V-VJ: >' r t,a.-**;, or ratt: of 
return. .Mountain Fuel has laneu * * • *'• *-*. • ,i..-. -.. 
supportina * < Commiss : OP ' <= findings c;.,a In s^ i.ndings a ~ 
supported 1; substantial evidence. The conclusions are supported 
by t he we i cv ' • * ^  l - ** •' 
Therefore, Respondent -ii;-•: Intervenors respectfully submit 
that the Commission's r-ier -h ;::d be affirmed. 
1> AT El> t l i i r , I h I 11 r, • \ . ; D e c e m b e r , 1 9 9 1 -
s>/f^>^) 
David Stott, Legal Counsel 
Utah Public Service Commission 
Laurie Noda, Asst. Atty. Gen, 
Division of Public Utilities 
Kent Walgrjen, Asst. Atty, Gen. 
Committee pjf Consumer Services 
6/
 See Priest, Principles of Public Utility Regulation, Vol. 
I , p , 80. See also. Committee of Consumer Services v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 595 P. 2d 871 (Utah 1979); Town of New Shoreham v. Rhode 
Island Public Util. Comm'n, 464 A,7d 7^0 (Rhode Island 1983) 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above 
JOINT BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS was mailed, postage 
pre-paid on this /<£ day of December, 1991 to the following: 
GARY G. SACKETT, ESQ. 
Questar Corporation 
180 East First South Street 
P.O. Box 11150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 




54-3-1 Charges must be just; service adequate; rules rea-
sonable-
Ail charges made, demanded or received by any public utility, or by any two 
or more public utilities, for any product or commodity furnished or to be 
furnished, or for any service rendered or to be rendered, shall be just and 
reasonable. Every unjust or unreasonable charge made, demanded or received 
for such product or commodity or service is hereby prohibited and declared 
unlawful. Every public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such ser-
vice, instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as will promote the safety, 
health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, employees and the public, and 
as will be in all respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. All rules and 
regulations made by a public utility affecting or pertaining to its charges or 
service to the public shall be just and reasonable. The scope of definition "just 
and reasonable" may include^but shall not be limited to, the cost of providing 
service to each category of customer, economic impact of charges on each 
category of customer, and on the well-being of the state of Utah; methods of 
reducing wide periodic variations in demand of such products, commodities or 
services, and means of encouraging conservation of resources and energy. 
54-4-4, Classification and fixing of rates after hearing. 
(1) Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing that the rates, 
fares, tolls, rentals, charges or classifications, or any of them demanded, ob-
served, charged or collected by any public utility for any service or product or 
commodity, or in connection therewith, including the rates or fares for excur-
sion or commutation tickets, or that the rules, regulations, practices or con-
tracts, or any of them, affecting such rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or 
classifications, or any of them, are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or 
preferential, or in anywise in violation of any provisions of law, or that such 
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or classifications are insufficient, the com-
mission shall determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates, fares, tolls, 
rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, practices or contracts to be 
thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order as hereinaf-
ter provided. 
(2) The commission shall have power to investigate a single rate, fare, toll, 
rental, charge, classification, rule, regulation, contract or practice, or any 
number thereof, or the entire schedule or schedules of rates, fares, tolls, 
rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts and practices, or 
any number thereof, of any public utility, and to establish, after hearing, new 
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, regulations, contracts 
or practices, or schedule or schedules in lieu thereof. 
(3) The commission, in its determination of just and reasonable rates, may 
consider recent changes in the utility's financial condition or changes reason-
ably expected, but not speculative, in the utility's revenues, expenses or in-
vestments and may adopt an appropriate future test period, not exceeding 
twelve months from the date of filing, including projections or projections 
together with a period of actual operations in determining the utility's test 
year for rate-making purposes. 
54-4-21, Valuation of public utilities. 
The commission shall have power to ascertain the value of the property ot 
every public utility in this state and every fact which in its judgment may or 
does have any bearing on such value. The commission shall have power to 
make revaluations from time to time and to ascertain the value of new g&n-
struction, extensions, and additions to the property of every public utility; 
provided, that the valuation of the property of all public utilities doing busi-
ness within this state located in Utah as recorded in accordance with Section 
54-4-22 of this chapter shall be considered the actual value of the properties of 
said public utilities in Utah unless otherwise changed after hearings by order 
of the commission. In case the commission changes the valuation of the prop-
erties of any public utility said new valuations'found by the commission shall 
be the valuations of said public utility for all purposes provided in this chap-
ter. 
54-7-19, Valuation oi utilities — Procedure — Findings 
conclusive evidence, 
(1) (a) In determining the value, or revaluing the property of a public utii 
ity as required by Section 54-4-21, the commission may hold hearings. 
(b) The commission may make a preliminary examination or investiga-
tion into the matters designated in this section and in Section 54-4-21 and 
may inquire into those matters in any other investigation or hearing. 
(c) The commission may seek any available sources of information. 
(d) (i) The evidence introduced at the hearing shall be reduced to writ-
ing and certified under the seal of the commission. 
(ii) The findings of the commission, when properly certified under 
the seal of the commission, are admissible in evidence in any action, 
proceeding, or hearing before the commission, and before any court as 
conclusive evidence of the facts as stated. 
(e) The commission's findings of facts can be controverted in a subse-
quent proceeding only by showing a subsequent change in conditions 
bearing upon the facts. 
(2) (a) The commission may hold further hearings and investigations to 
make revaluations or to determine the value of any betterments, im-
provements, additions, or extensions made by any public utility. 
(b) The commission may examine all matters that may change, modify, 
or affect any finding of fact previously made, and may make additional 
findings of fact to supplement findings of fact previously made. 
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH Brian T (Ted'Stewart Chairman 
James M Bvrne 
. HeberM Welts Building 
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 A _, Stephen F Mecham 
f 160 East 300 South 4th Floor 
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„ *• Executive Stan Director Governor 
Executive Staff Director 
Salt Lake Cty Utah 84145 Stephen C Hewlett 
(801) 530-6716 Commission Secretary 
M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: Parties, Docket No. 89-057-15 
FROM: Public Service Commission 
DATE: August 27, 1990 
SUBJECT: TEST-YEAR RATE BASE; PREPARATION OF COMPREHENSIVE EXHIBIT 
In this docket, parties differ on whether year-end or 
average rate base is appropriate for test period purposes. We intend 
to resolve the dispute early in the proceeding. 
As the first matter to be taken up when the hearing begins, 
each party will be expected to present, through its attorney or a 
designated witness, a concise statement of the reasons for its 
choice. Among other things, each statement must address, first, our 
use in recent US West and Utah Power & Light cases of average rate 
base in conjunction with historic test years, and second, the problem 
this choice creates for matching test year revenues, expenses, and 
rate base. So that necessary information will be on hand, the 
Company is directed to supply an exhibit establishing test-year rate 
base using average rate base as soon as possible. 
On another subject, we direct the parties to prepare a 
comprehensive joint exhibit setting forth the issues under considera-
tion in the docket, matched with descriptions of each party's 
position on each issue. Parties should plan to present the exhibit 
to the Commission prior to or as early in the hearing as possible. 
(\ r -f r* t** ^  
APPENDIX 3 
a APPENDIX 3 C O R P O R A T I O N 
Gan G. Sackett 
Associate General Counsel 
July 5, 1991 
Otfite 180 East First South St 
Salt Lake Cit\. Utah 84111 
Plume (801)534-5563 
Mail P.O.Box 11150 
Salt Lake Cit>, Utah 84147 
Fax (801)534-5131 
Stephen C. Hewlett, Secretary 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Dear Steve: 
Re: Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 910051 
As a follow-up to my conversations with Dave Stott and Utah Supreme Court 
clerk, Geoffrey J. Butler, Mountain Fuel Supply Company would like to designate the 
following additional portions of the record compiled in PSC Docket No. 89-057-15 
for transmittal to the Court in connection with the captioned appeal. If there are 
other portions of the record that the Commission or the two intervenors (the Utah 
Division of Public Utilities and the Committee of Consumer Services) wish to desig-
nate, please call me so that we can arrive at a stipulated portion of the record 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 16. 
Document 
Transcript of Proceedings 
Glenn H. Robinson Direct Testimony 
Glenn H. Robinson Rebuttal Testimony 
Glenn H. Robinson Exhibits 
Alan K. Allred Direct Testimony 
Alan K. Allred Rebuttal Testimony 
Alan K. Allred Exhibits 
James L. Balthaser Surrebuttal Testimony 
James L. Balthaser Exhibits 

















5.2 - 5.8, MFS-5.9, MFS 
5.10, revised MFS-5.11, 
MFS-5.12 - 5.19 
MFS-6SR 
MFS-6.1, 6.18, 6.19 
DPU-1 
Stephen C. Hewlett -2- July 5, 1991 
PSC 
Document Date Exhibit No. 
Chester G. Sullivant Surrebuttal Testimony 08-31-91 DPU-1SR 
Chester G. Sullivant Exhibits DPU-1.1 - 1.12 
Wesley D. Huntsman Direct Testimony 07-06-90 DPU-2 
Wesley D. Huntsman Surrebuttal 08-31-90 DPU-2SR 
Testimony 
Wesley D. Huntsman Exhibits DPU-2.2-2.11 
Carl L. Mower Surrebuttal Testimony 08-31-90 DPU-10 
Carl L. Mower Exhibit DPU-10.1 
Also, I note that the PSC pagination of the record duplicates pages 1-205, with 
a re-start of pagination for the September 5, 1990, transcript. To avoid confusion in 
citing to the record in the briefs, it would be helpful if you would contact Mr. Butler 
to discuss a solution. Also, Mountain Fuel reserves the right to specify additional 
documents under Rule 16 at a later time. 
If you have questions concerning this listing, please contact me so that we can 
work out the appropriate details as quickly as possible. 
Yours very truly, 
GGS-.lsl 
cc: Utah Supreme Court 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
David L. Stott, Esq. 
Committee of Consumer Services 
Kent Walgren, Assistant Attorney General 
Division of Public Utilities 
Laurie L. Noda, Assistant Attorney General 
D89-001A\PSCU917.L 
|. \ State of Utah 
i 
F/ DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Division of Public Utilities 
N o r m a n H Bangerter g 
Governor § 
r\ J i D ui 1 HeberM Wells Butldmg Dav id L Buh le r | a 
Executive Director I 1 6 0 E a s t 3°0 South/P O Box 45802 
F rank Johnson 1 Salt Lake C.iy Utah 84145-0802 
Division Director I (801)530-6651 
July 10, 1991 
Stephen C. Hewlett, Secretary 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
Heber Wells Building 4th Floor 
160 East 300 So. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Re: Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 91-000-51 
Dear Steve, 
Pursuant to the letter I received from Gary Sackett on July 5, 
1991, the Division would like to have designated the following 
documents in connection with the captioned appeal. 
PSC 
Document Date Exhibit No. 
Mary Cleveland 7-6-90 DPU-6 
Direct Testimony 
Mary Cleveland 8-31-90 DPU-6SR 
Surrebuttal Testimony 
Mary Cleveland Exhibits DPU-6.1-6.5 
Nile W. Eatmon 7-6-90 DPU-5 
Direct Testimony 
Nile W. Eatmon 8-31-90 DPU-5SR 
Surrebuttal Testimony 
Nile W. Eatmon Exhibits DPU-5.1-5.6 
DPU-5.1SR-
5.4SR 
Phillip S. Teumim 7-16-90 DPU-8GS 
Direct Testimony 
Phillip S. Teumim 9-12-90 DPU-8SRGS 
Surrebuttal Testimony 
The Division reserves the right to specify additional 
documents under Rule 16 at a later time. 
If you have any questions or problems, please let me know. 
Sincerely, 
(XaujuJi /)dd^^ 
Laur ie L. Noda 
Assistant Attorney General 
Division of Public Utilities 
cc: Mountain Fuel Supply Co, 
Gary Sackett 
Committee of Consumer Services 
Kent Walgren 
OEFIO OF 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
,#'' OF Tfjy^ 
STA TE OF UTAH 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - ATTORNEY GENERAL 
/ j f y tt SOU! H S"l AT L SI R> h~l, b IbVhNTH H(K)R • SAl I l A M - C i n U I \ H 84111 • l l l fcPHONl 801 5 ^ ^200 • bAX 801 S U 3216 
JOSEPH E TESCH 
CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
July 9, 1991 
Stephen C. Hewlett, Secretary 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Re: Certification of Record in Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co. v." Public Service Commission, Utah Supreme 
Court Case No. 910051 
Dear Steve: 
In response to Mr. Sackett's letter of July 5, 1991, 
following are the additional parts of the record from PSC Docket 
No. 89-057-15 which the Committee of Consumer Services would like 
designated as part of the record. In the event further portions 
of the record are needed after Mountain Fuel files its Briefs 
with the Court, Mr. Sackett has stated that he will not object to 
additional documents being made available to the Court pursuant 




Michael Arndt Direct Testimony 
Michael Arndt Surrebuttal Testimony 
Matty Marcus Direct Testimony 
Matty Marcus Surrebuttal Testimony 
Williamson Testimony re Green Mtn. Power 
Central Vermont Public Service, 
Public Service of New Hampshire 
and Narragansit Transit 





CCS Cross 1 
CCS Cross 2 
We are presuming that the Brief filed by the Committee on 
September 28, 1990 and the Committee's response to Mountain 
Fuel's Application for rehearing have already been certified. If 
not, please consider this a formal request that they be included 
with the above. 




Assistant Attorney General 
Committee of Consumer Services 
cc: Utah Supreme Court 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
David L. Stott, Esq. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 
Gary Sackett, Esq 
Division of Public Utilities 




fountain Fuel Supply Company 
Docket No. 89-057-15 
James I. Balthaser 
Exhibit Mo. 6.20 
Type of Test Year tod Rate Base 
Used in Determining Ces Rates M 
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APPENDIX 5 
APPENDIX 5 
Docket No. 89-057-15 
Joint Exhibit No. 3 
Expenses 
*Issue: Joint Exhibit 2, page 5 of 11, line 13 - Year-end Depreciation 
MFS DPU CCS 
250 250 - 0 -
Explanation: Annualization of 1989 depreciation to reflect year-end rate base. 
MFS Position: This annualization is a known and measurable change which is necessary to match 
depreciation expense with year-end rate base. Both year-end rate base and this 
depreciation expense annualization should be allowed in order to reflect most accurately 
the conditions during the period in which the rates will be in effect. 
DPU Position: The Division recommends the annualization of 1989 depreciation to reflect year-end rate 
base. The reason is that annualization changes within the test year are allowed under the 
Commission's annualization policy. 
CCS Position: The Committee's position is that this adjustment is neither necessary nor proper for 
ratemaking purposes. The average test year approach produces the desired matching of 
investment, revenues and expenses. Year-end annualizations are complex, speculative 
and contrary to the Commission's intent to simplify the ratemaking process. 
23 
Docket No. 89-05745 
Joint Exhibit No. 3 
Expenses 
*Issue: Joint Exhibit 2, page 5 of 11, line 14 - Production-related Depreciation 
MFS DPU ces 
277 277 - 0 -
Explanation: Post-test year adjustment to reflect 1990 production of Company owned gas and the 
lower 1990 unit deprecation rate. 
MFS Position: This adjustment is known and measurable, as it is based on the depreciation rate per unit 
for 1990 and planned 1990 Company-owned gas production levels reflected in Docket 
Nos. 90-057-02 and 90-057-07. The adjustment is necessary to reflect most accurately 
the conditions during the test year in which the rates will be in effect. 
DPU Position: The Division adjusted depreciation at December 31, 1989 year ending levels to reflect 
the use of year end rate base. The Division did not use average rate base. The Division 
used year end rate base because it felt that it more accurately reflect the conditions that 
would exist at the time rates go into effect. 
CCS Position: The Committee's position is that this adjustment is neither necessary nor proper for 
ratemaking purposes. The average test year approach produces the desired matching of 
investment, revenues and expenses. Year-end annualizations are complex, speculative 
and contrary to the Commission's intent to simplify the ratemaking process. 
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